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INTRODUCTION 
In 1789, it was possible to speak of a federation of distinct states joined 
together for their mutual advantage, but today, it is rather the nation that is 
divided into subnational units. What caused this shift in focus from the 
states to the federal government? Surely, the transformation from a 
collection of thirteen historically separate states clustered along the 
Atlantic seaboard to a group of fifty states largely carved out of federal 
territory has played a role. Building on previous analysis of the economics 
of federalism, this Article considers the dynamic effects of increasing the 
number of states on the efficient allocation of government authority 
between the state and federal governments. When the number of states is 
low, the externalities imposed by state-level actions are more limited, and 
so is the scope of federal power. When the number increases, however, the 
scope of efficient federal power expands because the states face collective 
action problems.  
In the second Part of this Article, we apply these insights from the 
economics of federalism to the question of the optimal number of states in 
a federal system. Having too few states will lead to insufficient cohesion at 
the federal level, risking secession, and ensuring weak government. On the 
other end of the scale, having too many states encourages the centralization 
of power. While the optimal number of states in a federal system will 
ultimately depend on geography, legal culture, and technology, the 
available data suggest that the ten provinces of Canada may be too few, but 
the fifty states of the United States may well be too many. 
What difference did it make to American federalism and constitutional 
law between 1791 and 1912 that the United States grew from being a 
federation of only thirteen coequal states to being a federation of forty-
eight coequal states? This Article will attempt to speculate about that 
important question—a question which has not been systematically 
analyzed so far in the otherwise extensive law review literature on 
federalism.1 With its fifty states, the United States federation today has 
many more member units than it started out with and many more than do 
other federations around the world. Our thesis in this Article is that this 
trend in American federalism is a very consequential and under-
appreciated development. 
                                                                                                                     
 1. The impact of the number of states on collective action problems in federal systems has 
been explored by Peter H. Aranson, Federalism as Collective Action (Mar. 29, 1995) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). For an analysis of optimal nation size, see generally, ALBERTO 
ALESINA & ENRICO SPOLAORE, THE SIZE OF NATIONS (2005), and ROBERT. A. DAHL & EDWARD R. 
TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY (1973) (evaluating optimal nation size by comparing size and 
democracy at both national and subnational levels). For a static analysis of the optimal number of 
states in a federal system, see ALESINA & SPOLAORE, supra, at 137–53 (assuming a division of 
powers between federal and state governments and then determining the optimal number of states). 
This Article considers the inverse relationship over time: how does the number of states affect the 
division of powers between federal and state governments? 
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In comparing federalisms around the world today, we see some 
federations with a relatively small number of member states or autonomous 
regional entities, like Australia with six states,2 Belgium with three 
autonomous regions,3 and Canada with more territory than America but 
with only ten provinces4—a mere 20% of the fifty United States today. 
Other federations and confederations have a middling number of state 
equivalents, like Switzerland with twenty-six cantons or half cantons,5 and 
the European Union with twenty-seven member nations.6 India has twenty-
eight states, as well as seven union territories administered by the federal 
government.7 Mexico has thirty-one states;8 Brazil has twenty-six states,9 
and Argentina has twenty-three provinces.10 The United States stands 
outside of the pack, however, with fifty coequal federal subunits, and it 
reached this status early on. In 1860, at the outset of the Civil War, the 
United States already had thirty-four states, eleven of which banded 
together in an attempt to secede.11 How would American history have been 
different and how would the United States be different today if the 
accidents of history had given us four states—one in the Northeast, one in 
the South, one in the Midwest, and one in the West? Would secession have 
worked? Would the federal government be a lot weaker than it is today? 
We seek herein to speculate on these questions. 
 The boundary lines of the fifty American states are mostly the result of 
very arbitrary and almost random occurrences. The thirteen original 
colonies, which successfully seceded from the quasifederalism of the 
British Empire, owed their boundaries to the accident of the first 
settlements in British North America. The Virginia colony thus grew out of 
the Jamestown settlement, the Massachusetts colony grew out of the 
Plymouth and Boston settlements, and the other eleven original colonies 
had similar beginnings.  
The most consequential decision made by the founding generation in 
this respect was the cession of all the western lands claimed by Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and other states to the federal government to 
                                                                                                                     
 2. The World Factbook 2010, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2051.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. The World Factbook 2010—European Union, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (last visited Nov. 15, 
2010). 
 7. THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2010, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2051.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. July 11 1861: Ten Senators Expelled, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ 
history/minute/Ten_Senators_Expelled.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
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become the Northwest Territories, which included all of the U.S. land 
north of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi. This cession of the 
Northwest Territories to the Articles of Confederation Congress occurred 
in part to prevent Virginia from becoming too much bigger and, thus, more 
powerful than all the other states.12 Critically, the Northwest Territory was 
carved up into what became the six states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota, rather than itself being 
admitted just as one big state.13 
The partition of the Northwest Territory into six states in turn set a 
crucial precedent for the enormous lands west of the Mississippi River, 
which were acquired from the French Emperor Napoleon as part of the 
Louisiana Purchase.14 The Louisiana Purchase involved the acquisition of 
territory that today includes portions of fifteen current U.S. states, 
including all of present-day Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Oklahoma, Kansas, 
and Nebraska, and parts of Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, New 
Mexico, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Texas, and Louisiana.15 The land 
included in the Louisiana Purchase amounts to 23% of the whole territory 
of the United States today,16 but it is divided among fifteen states! Other 
important additions of territory followed—especially as a result of the 
Mexican War,17 the Gadsden Purchase,18 the Alaska Purchase,19 and the 
annexation of Hawaii20—while some territories held in 1787 (Kentucky,21 
                                                                                                                     
 12. See MAX FARRAND, THE FATHERS OF THE CONSTITUTION 56–59 (Allen Johnson ed., 1921); 
Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on States 
Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 127 (2004) (noting the emphasis on some rough 
population parity in admitting states from the Northwest Territory); Luis R. Dávila-Colón, Equal 
Citizenship, Self-Determination, and the U.S. Statehood Process: A Constitutional and Historical 
Analysis, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 315, 316 (1981). For the formal adoption of the Northwest 
Ordinance into law, see An Act to provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the 
river Ohio, ch. 41, 1 Stat. 50 (1789). It is worth noting that despite ceding a substantial portion of 
its territory, Virginia nonetheless produced four of the first five presidents. THE WORLD ALMANAC 
AND BOOK OF FACTS 2010, at 521. 
 13. See Biber, supra note 12, at 132; Minn. Office of the Sec. of State, The Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, http://www.sos.state.mn.us/index.aspx?page=643 (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). 
 14. See Biber, supra note 12, at 139; LIBR. CONG., LOUISIANA: EUROPEAN EXPLORATIONS AND 
THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 10 (2007), available at http://international.loc.gov:8081/ammem/collect 
ions/maps/lapurchase/lapurchase.pdf. 
 15. LIBR. CONG., supra note 14. 
 16. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 2002, pt. 1-1, 
available at http://www.blm.gov/natacq/pls02/pls11_02.pdf (part titled “ACQUISITION OF THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN, 1781–1867”). 
 17. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, U.S.-
Mex., art. V, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 (ceding certain Mexican land to the United States). 
 18. U.S. Dep’t of State: Office of the Historian, Gadsden Purchase, 1853–1854, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/87721.htm. 
 19. U.S. Dep’t of State: Office of the Historian, Purchase of Alaska, 1867, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/gp/17662.htm. 
 20. MARK STEIN, HOW THE STATES GOT THEIR SHAPES 75–78 (2008). 
 21. Id. at 108–12. 
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Tennessee,22 Vermont,23 and Maine24) were all admitted as additional 
individual states on equal footing with the original thirteen. 
Indeed, as early as 1820, only thirty-one years after the Constitution had 
gone into effect, the United States had twenty-three states—almost twice as 
many as when it had started.25 From that time on, the only significant 
controversy about adding states concerned keeping the numbers of new 
slave and free states equal.26 By the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, the 
Union was up to thirty-four states,27 and by 1913, when the federal 
structure of the national government was radically altered by the additions 
of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments authorizing the federal 
income tax and providing for the direct election of senators, the Union had 
forty-eight states.28 The Framers’ concern that Virginia not be too much 
larger than the other twelve original states led unintentionally to a national 
policy of creating numerous new states out of territories rather than out of a 
few big ones.29 It is for this reason that we today have fifty states rather 
than, say, twenty, and that is very consequential. 
This Article will theorize about the likely effects of going from a small-
number-of-states confederation of thirteen states to a large-number-of-
states confederation of forty-eight states in 1912 in light of the economics 
of federalism. In previous writing, Professor Steven Calabresi has written 
about some of the economic policy arguments for empowering the national 
government and some of the economic policy arguments for empowering 
the state governments.30 What effect is there on each of these arguments 
when you go from a few state federation of thirteen to a numerous state 
federation of forty-eight? What are the implications of the American 
experience for federalism in Australia, Canada, Germany, Belgium, 
Switzerland, and the European Union?  
Part I addresses the question of how increasing the number of states 
affects the economic case in favor of empowering the federal government. 
Part II addresses the question of how increasing the number of states 
affects the economic case in favor of empowering the states. Part III 
considers the question of whether any meaningful kind of federalism is 
even possible once the number of states increases beyond a certain point. 
Put another way, what is the optimal number of states a federation ought to 
                                                                                                                     
 22. Id. at 257–62. 
 23. Id. at 276–80. 
 24. Id. at 119–25. 
 25. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2010, at 454. 
 26. See James P. Muehlberger, Reflections on Lincoln’s Kansas Campaign, 78 J. KAN. BAR 
ASS’N, Nov./Dec. 2009, at 24, 25 (2009). 
 27. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2010, at 454. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See FARRAND, supra note 12, at 56–59. 
 30. See Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In 
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 774–84 (1995). 
5
Calabresi and Terrell: The Number of States and the Economics of American Federalism
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
6 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
have if one wants to maintain a balance between national and state power 
so as to benefit from the economics of federalism? 
I.  THE NUMBER OF STATES AND THE CASE FOR AUGMENTING 
NATIONAL POWER 
 This Part will argue that the United States’ move from thirteen states at 
the Founding to forty-eight by 1912 greatly strengthened the public choice 
and economics of federalism cases for augmenting national power. We will 
discuss a number of economics of federalism arguments that are commonly 
made for empowering the federal government, and we will show that all of 
those arguments become more compelling as the number of states in a 
federation increases. We begin with collective action problems and end 
with problems of pluralism and civil rights. 
A.  Collective Action Problems 
1.  War and Foreign Affairs 
The most compelling argument in American history for empowering 
our national government has been the need to overcome collective action 
problems.31 All of Britain’s colonies faced such a collective action problem 
in 1776 when Americans demanded the right to be represented in 
Parliament if they were going to be taxed, but only some parts of the 
British Imperial Federation were able to band together to secede. Notably, 
the British North American colonies in Canada chose not to leave the 
Empire at that point.32 The thirteen colonies which did band together 
collectively to secede from Britain in 1776 quickly realized that they were 
struggling to act together to win the Revolutionary War and then to protect 
themselves from foreign enemies in the 1780s.33 A principal argument for 
writing the U.S. Constitution in 1787 was that a stronger federal 
government was needed for defense or foreign policy reasons.34 Many 
feared that the thirteen states acting collectively would be unable to defend 
themselves from being reacquired by Britain or being seized by some other 
                                                                                                                     
 31. See generally, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Federalism and Collective Action, 45 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1241, 1241 (1997) (arguing that, “[W]e can understand the . . . federal system as a pragmatic 
response to collective action problems, which arise when a group of individual actors would benefit 
from cooperation, but lack the individual incentives to act collectively.”). 
 32. Under the Articles of Confederation, Canada in fact had a specific invitation to join the 
break-away colonies. It alone was guaranteed admission to the confederation. ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XI. 
 33. Calvin H. Johnson, States Rights? What States’ Rights?: Implying Limitations on the 
Federal Government from the Overall Design, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 225, 227 (2009); see also Matthew 
D. van Dalen, Rumsfeld v. FAIR, A Free Speech Setback or Strategic Military Victory?, 31 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 75, 90–91 (2007). 
 34. See Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV. 29, 40–41 (2005). 
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European empire.35 
 In American history, the need to defend against a foreign enemy or to 
win a war, once one has started, has always led to the augmentation of 
national power.36 National power emerged and grew in the 1770s and 
1780s out of a need to cooperate against Britain;37 it expanded enormously 
during and after the Civil War;38 and it then again grew enormously during 
World War II such that national wage and price controls came to be 
thought of as within the scope of federal power.39 Federations start as 
mutual defense pacts to solve a collective action problem, and federal 
governments grow in power in response to foreign threats. 
Foreign threats are not, however, the only military collective action 
problem against which federalism protects. Federations also face the 
collective action problem of warfare among the members of the federation. 
In the seventy-five years between 1870 and 1945, the peace and harmony 
of Western Europe was interrupted by three Franco-German Wars: the 
Franco-Prussian War, World War I, and World War II. This is a collective 
action of the most destructive and ruinous kind. The modern day federation 
of the European Union began and has been built in part to end such warfare 
on the European Continent, and the EU, along with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Alliance, has done that.40 
In the 1770s and 1780s, many founding generation Americans feared  
that there might emerge two or three federations with shared land 
boundaries in the area that is now the United States and that warfare might 
erupt among them, creating a need for standing armies and a concomitant 
loss of liberty.41 Some Framers believed that the English tradition of liberty 
was in part a product of Britain’s island geography, for which there was no 
need for a standing army to defend itself, since it could rely instead on its 
navy to prevent invasion.42 Sailors are less numerous and less of a threat to 
domestic liberty than are soldiers.43 Abraham Lincoln thought that one of 
the many reasons why it was vital to keep the Union together was to avoid 
the prospect of future warfare between the Confederacy and the North over 
issues such as access to the Gulf of Mexico from the Mississippi River 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See Johnson, supra note 33. 
 36. See generally JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: A HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER FROM 
GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH (2009) (outlining historical boundaries of presidential 
power and noting how those boundaries expand in times of national crisis). 
 37. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 
483, 489–90 (1991). 
 38. Id. at 490–91. 
 39. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 422–23 (1944) (holding the Emergency 
Price Control Act to be a valid exercise of congressional power). 
 40. Amar, supra note 37, at 494–97. 
 41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 5, at 51–53 (John Jay) (Rossiter ed., 1961); Amar, supra note 37, at 
486–91. 
 42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, at 70–71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Rossiter ed., 1961); Amar, supra 
note 37, at 486–90. 
 43. Amar, supra note 37, at 490.  
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through the port of New Orleans.44 
Civil war between states or warfare between neighboring countries is 
the ultimate collective action problem, and it is averted by enhancing the 
power of national and transnational entities.45 This is a principle argument 
as to why it is often desirable to enhance national or transnational power. 
How then does increasing the number of states from thirteen in 1790, to 
thirty-four in 1861, and to forty-eight in 1912 affect the collective action 
problem of providing for a common defense and protecting against civil 
warfare? We begin with the problem of providing for the common defense. 
A loose confederacy of a very small number of states—say, four—
would face very low costs in organizing defense against specific enemies 
and threats, so it would have less of a need to delegate broad and 
permanent defense powers to a national or transnational entity than would 
a confederacy with more member states.46 As the number of member states 
goes up from four to thirteen to thirty-four and then to forty-eight, the costs 
of organizing against each specific threat as it arises increase 
exponentially, and the need for a permanent central national or 
transnational entity increases.47 It is more difficult and more expensive to 
coordinate forty-eight armies, navies, and foreign policies than it is to 
coordinate four or even thirteen. As an example, George Washington found 
coordination of thirteen state militias during the Revolutionary War and its 
aftermath to be so exasperating that he led in the effort to draft the U.S. 
Constitution so that future Americans would never face that problem.48 
The state militias survived ratification of the Constitution until eleven 
of the thirty-four states seceded in 1860 and 1861 and fought against the 
other twenty-three.49 The militias were thereafter folded into the National 
Guard and subordinated,50 which may well have become essential once the 
number of state militias increased from thirteen at the Founding to thirty-
four in 1861. One would expect that as the number of states increased from 
                                                                                                                     
 44. See id. at 490–91. 
 45. See Enrico Spolaore, National Borders and the Size of Nations, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 778, 794 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman, eds., 
2006) (viewing defense as a public good). But see id. at 795 (noting the possibility under certain 
conditions of increased coordinating power leading to more overall conflict through an increase in 
the number—and decrease in the size—of states). See generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC 
CHOICE III 9–16 (2003) (discussing the formation of states as a response to collective action 
problems); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS (1971) (discussing collective action problems of groups engaged in the provision of public 
goods). 
 46. See OLSON, supra note 45, at 33–36. 
 47. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 passim (1937) (on the firm as 
a solution to transaction costs); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16–17 
(1960) (on the firm as a solution to externalities in the presence of transaction costs). 
 48. See YOO, supra note 36, at 10–11 (suggesting this experience was crucial in making 
Washington a supporter of a strong executive). 
 49. See Amar, supra note 37, at 501–02. 
 50. Militia Act of 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-33, 32 Stat. 775 (1903) (creating the National Guard). 
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thirteen to thirty-four, it would become more and more costly to leave 
anything of a military or foreign policy sort (like the militias) under state 
control because of the escalating costs of collective action. It is thus 
entirely predictable that the state militias would be forced to fade into 
irrelevance after eleven of them were so impertinent as to wage war against 
the other twenty-three. 
What about the effects of an increasing number of states on the 
likelihood of an outbreak of a civil war and on that war’s prospects for 
success? Here, increases in the number of states cut in both directions. On 
the one hand, one would expect that thirty-four states in 1861 would have 
more profound disagreements and controversies among themselves than 
thirteen states would have had in 1790. If you multiply the number of states 
who are actors, there are bound to be more disagreements among those 
states. Moreover, a few of the states—think South Carolina during the 
Nullification Crisis51—are bound to take positions that are especially 
provocative and extreme. Thus, a federation with a lot of states will likely 
have a few that are real outliers, as Louisiana, Vermont, and Utah are 
today. In this respect, increasing the number of states and making each 
state smaller will facilitate factional capture of a state and the taking of 
extreme positions. 
On the other hand, however, is that increasing the number of states also 
creates a severe collective action problem for any would-be secessionists.52 
A successful secession in the face of military resistance requires that a 
large percentage of the states with a large percentage of the federation’s 
population and wealth participate in the separation.  
Consider the collective action problem that helped to forestall Southern 
secession during the Civil War. In 1861, there were fifteen slave states in 
an area that today has sixteen states: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.53 In 
addition, slavery was legal in the District of Columbia, in the territorial 
area that became Oklahoma, and in parts of the Nebraska Territory.54 The 
number of slave and free states was deliberately kept even until 1858 to 
                                                                                                                     
 51. Letter from Andrew Jackson, President of the United States, to Martin Van Buren, Vice 
President of the United States (Jan. 13, 1833), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/mcc:@field%28DOCID+@lit%28mcc/050%29%29. 
 52. See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving 
Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 10–15 (discussing the sovereign-
constituency transgression game with repeated interactions). 
 53. JEREMY BLACK, AMERICA AS A MILITARY POWER: FROM THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO 
THE CIVIL WAR 140 (2002). 
 54. R.O. Joe Cassity, Jr., Residential Segregation Law on the Southwestern Frontier: 1889-
1939, S.U. L. REV. 167, 169 (2004); Paul Finkelman, The Dred Scott Case, Slavery and the Politics 
of Law, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 8–10 (1996). 
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ensure an equal number of pro-slavery and anti-slavery senators.55 In 1860 
and 1861, only eleven of the fifteen slave states seceded, while four—
Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri—did not leave the Union.56 
The non-secession of those four slave states, coupled with federal control 
over the District of Columbia and all the territories, may well have been 
indispensible to the North’s victory. In addition, one of the slave states that 
seceded split in two (Virginia), with the free counties becoming the new 
pro-Union state of West Virginia.57 Thus, in 1860, of the states in the 
geographical area where slavery was legal, almost one third of them—five 
out of sixteen—did not secede.  
This may well be the collective action problem that doomed the 
Confederacy. As late as the summer of 1864, Abraham Lincoln was 
trailing in his re-election bid because the North had not won a bitter war.58 
How much worse would things have been for the Union had Delaware, 
Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri—not to mention the District of 
Columbia, Oklahoma, and Kansas—all joined forces against a Union 
government with its capital in, say, New York City, which was besieged by 
anti-draft riots?59 A good case can be made that the Confederacy was done 
in by the high cost of organizing secession among so many different legal 
and political actors. The Confederacy came much closer to succeeding than 
South Carolina had during the Nullification Crisis, because nearly one 
third of the states—eleven out of thirty-four—were defying federal power. 
Even that was not enough. 
Consider the costs of collective action and what American politics 
might look like today if we had only four states instead of fifty: the 
Northeast, the South, the Midwest, and the West. Having lived in three of 
these four regions and having observed their distinctive regional 
subcultures, the authors think we would have serious regional secessionist 
movements if the number of states had panned out differently. The divide 
between red state and blue state America in presidential elections shows, 
among other things, a continuing sharp split between the South on one side 
and the Northeast and Pacific Coast on the other. If we had four states 
instead of fifty and if state lines corresponded to the regional divisions just 
mentioned, we think there might be serious talk of secession. Moreover, 
the federal government would be much less powerful and would be kept by 
the four regional superstates on a very short leash. 
Those who doubt this need generally only compare U.S. federalism to 
                                                                                                                     
 55. Roberta Alexander, Dred Scott: The Decision that Sparked a Civil War, 34 N. KY. L. 
REV. 643, 646–47 (2007). 
 56. Joanne Freeman, Lib. Cong., Time Line of the Civil War, 1861, 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/cwphtml/tl1861.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
 57. STEIN, supra note 20, at 285–86. 
 58. Joanne Freeman, Lib. Cong., Time Line of the Civil War, 1864, http://memory.loc.gov/ 
ammem/cwphtml/tl1864.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
 59. LESLIE M. HARRIS, IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN NEW YORK CITY, 
1626–1863, at 279–88 (2003). 
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that of Belgium or Canada. Canada is bigger than the United States but has 
only ten provinces, one of which is French-speaking Quebec.60 Quebec is 
populous and large, and a referendum of secession in 1995 was defeated 
there only by the thinnest of margins: 50.6% to 49.4%.61 The Canadian 
Supreme Court has ruled that Quebec has a constitutional right to secede, 
albeit not unilaterally and not without negotiations with the federal 
government in Ottawa.62 The drawing of provincial boundary lines to 
correspond with linguistic, ethnic, and religious cleavages makes Quebec 
Province very different from all of the other nine provinces. Imagine how 
peaceful Canadian politics might be if Canada had fifty provinces instead 
of ten. Imagine the benefit of provincial boundary lines that are arbitrary 
and random the way U.S. state boundary lines are and that cross cut 
linguistic, ethnic, and religious cleavages.63 
Now consider another non-democratic federation that recently split 
apart into fifteen sub-national units. This is, of course, the former Soviet 
Union, which had fifteen Republics, only one of which is the current 
Russian Federation.64 The so-called constitution of the former U.S.S.R. 
had a grandiose Bill of Rights guaranteeing liberties of all sorts, including 
a right of secession.65 No provision of the U.S.S.R.’s constitution was ever 
followed other than the secession clause. Why were nations like Ukraine, 
which had been Russian for hundreds of years, able to achieve 
independence from a nuclear-armed communist dictatorship? With only 
fifteen member Republics—many with their own histories and dialects or 
languages—covering the largest geographical area of any nation on earth, 
the costs of collective secessionist action were simply not that high. Had 
the U.S.S.R. been a fifty state federation, it would probably still be around 
today. 
Consider the successful secession of the thirteen American colonies 
from the British Empire in 1776. There were major costs to this collective 
action, as mentioned above, and General Washington almost lost the war 
because of the weakness of the central government under the Articles of 
Confederation. Prior to the war, Britain directed its ire at only the tax 
rebels in Massachusetts in hopes that it could divide them from the other 
colonists. The so-called Intolerable or Coercive Acts in 1774 were targeted 
only at Massachusetts, but by then, Britain had tried to impose a sugar tax, 
a stamp tax, and a tea tax affecting all thirteen colonies. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that they all came to Massachusetts’ side. The colonies in 
the end overcame the collective action problem of uniting to secede from 
the British Empire, in part because they were so different from Britain and 
had so much in common with one another. 
                                                                                                                     
 60. The World Factbook 2010, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2051.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
 61. 15 THE NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 475 (15th ed. 2005). 
 62. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 55–56 (Can.). 
 63. See generally STEIN, supra note 20 (providing an overview of the historical accidents 
leading to the current state boundaries in the United States). 
 64. 28 THE NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 998 (15th ed. 2005). 
 65. KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977) [KONST. SSSR] art. 72 [USSR CONSTITUTION]. 
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Another successful secession occurred on January 1, 1993, when the 
Slovak people dissolved their union with the Czech people even though the 
differences between the two peoples are vanishingly small.66 The fact that 
Czechoslovakia dissolved so easily is no doubt attributable in part to the 
fact that it consisted of only two peoples, each living in geographically 
defined areas, rather than fifty peoples living comingled with one another. 
This made the cost of secessionist action by the Slovaks very low. 
Low secession cost also led at this time to the dissolution of the six 
republic federation of Yugoslavia.67 Under Marshal Tito, its formidable 
and moderate longtime communist dictator, Yugoslavia had seemed to be a 
model of inter-ethnic tolerance, but with Tito’s death, it dissolved fairly 
swiftly and violently.68 The fact that it had only six republics, rather than, 
say, twenty-five or fifty, and that each republic, like Quebec, contained a 
territorially homogenous ethnic, linguistic, or religious group, made Tito’s 
federation much more unstable than any realized. The violent dissolution 
of Yugoslavia calls to mind both the partition of British India into Islamic 
Pakistan and Hindu India in 194769 and the partition of Ireland into 
Protestant Northern Ireland and the Catholic Republic of Ireland in 1921.70 
Here again, the division of the population into two main groups—Hindus 
and Muslims in India and Catholics and Protestants in Ireland—greatly 
lowered the cost of collective secessionist action.  
A similarly low cost of collective action has led to serious devolution 
movements in Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain, and France. Belgium 
has devolved tremendous power to its Flemish and Walloon 
communities,71 and it seems quite possible it will peacefully dissolve as 
did Czechoslovakia. The United Kingdom recently devolved some power 
to Scotland and Wales,72 and the movement for Scottish independence still 
remains a real threat to the United Kingdom, despite the unity of the 
Crown since 1603 and Parliament since 1707.73 The division of the British 
island into two peoples—the English and the Scots—may prove as 
unstable as the division of Czechoslovakia into Czechs and Slovaks. Spain 
faces similar problems with Catalonia and the Basque Region74 while 
                                                                                                                     
 66. 3 THE NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 837 (15th ed. 2005). 
 67. See 12 THE NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 870–71 (15th ed. 2005). 
 68. Id. 
 69. For a discussion on the partition of British India in Pakistan and India, see 21 THE NEW 
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 109–10 (15th ed. 2005). 
 70. For a discussion on the partition of Ireland into Northern Ireland and Ireland, see 9 THE 
NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 679–80 (15th ed. 2005). 
 71. See 2 THE NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 62 (15th ed. 2005). 
 72. Cabinet Secretariat, Devolution—Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/secretariats/ 
economic_and_domestic/legislative_programme/guide_html/devolution.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 
2010). 
 73. See 12 THE NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 132–33 (15th ed. 2005). 
 74. Simon James, EU Reactions to Kosovo’s Independence: The Lessons for Scotland, 5 
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France has to deal with a terrorist secessionist movement on the island of 
Corsica.75 
American history offers two examples of unsuccessful secessionist 
pressure by a single state’s action. In the 1780s, tiny Rhode Island 
boycotted the Philadelphia Convention that produced the Constitution,76 
and it then refused to ratify the Constitution, presumably for fear that the 
new federal government would tax its wealthy merchants.77 For similar 
reasons, Rhode Island had earlier been the lone state to veto an amendment 
to the Articles of Confederation that would have given Congress the power 
to regulate and tax commerce.78 The Articles of Confederation could only 
be amended by all thirteen colonies acting unanimously.79 Rhode Island 
thus tried to block ratification of the Constitution by denying its consent. 
The other states, however, called Rhode Island’s bluff. By the spring of 
1790, President Washington had the new federal government up and 
running under the Constitution without Rhode Island, but with all twelve 
of the other thirteen original states.80 Washington declared that he would 
start imposing customs duties on all trade between the United States and 
Rhode Island, causing the wealthy merchants in Providence and Newport 
to threaten secession and the Antifederalists in the state to back down.81 
Rhode Island ratified the Constitution by two votes on its third try in 
1790.82 
A second example in American history of a single state failing to rebel 
against the federal government came with South Carolina’s effort to nullify 
a high federal tariff in the Nullification Controversy of 1832.83 South 
Carolina called a special convention analogous to the convention that had 
ratified the Constitution, and the convention adopted an ordinance 
declaring the federal tariff null and void within the territorial confines of 
South Carolina.84 President Andrew Jackson issued a proclamation 
declaring South Carolina’s ordinance unconstitutional, and Congress 
                                                                                                                     
(2008), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/files/media/articles/2008/Kosovo08.pdf. 
 75. Id. at 12. 
 76. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 
505 (1995). 
 77. Id. at 538–39. 
 78. Id. at 489 (noting that attempts to impress upon Rhode Island the necessity of the taxing 
power foundered after Virginia withdrew its consent, effectively scuttling the amendment); 
Johnson, supra note 33, at 227. 
 79. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII. 
 80. See Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 76, at 537–38. 
 81. Id. at 538–39. 
 82. Id. at 539. 
 83. William J. Rich, Lessons of Charleston Harbor: The Rise, Fall and Revival of Pro-
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passed a force bill authorizing President Jackson to use military force to 
subdue South Carolina if necessary.85 South Carolina acquiesced and 
repealed its ordinance of nullification, but it learned that the next time it 
wanted to challenge federal power—which turned out to be in 1860—it 
would need to seek allies from among the other states. In 1832, there were 
only twenty-four states in the Union (twelve of which were slave states),86 
whereas in 1860, there were thirty-four states in the Union (only fifteen of 
which were slave states).87 The logic of collective action suggests that 
South Carolina waited too long to try to organize a secession.88 
In 1798, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, whereby the two 
states—led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison—tried to declare that 
the newly passed Federal Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional, 
providing a foreshadowing event for the Nullification Controversy.89 The 
Resolutions claimed the states had formed the Union and that they could 
interpose themselves against unconstitutional assertions of federal power. 
Rhode Island passed a resolution disagreeing and claiming that the federal 
Constitution was only to be enforced by the federal courts.90 The 
controversy was taken to the American people in the election of 1800, and 
Jefferson was elected President while his allies won control of Congress.91 
As a result, the Alien and Sedition Acts died with Jefferson pardoning 
those convicted under them.92  
In conclusion, we argue that the case for enhancing federal power over 
war-making or foreign affairs becomes stronger as the number of member 
states in a federation increases. We also conclude that the likelihood of a 
successful secession or civil war decreases sharply as the number of 
member states in a federation increases. This is especially true if state 
boundary lines are drawn arbitrarily, as they were in the United States, 
rather than territorially to empower linguistic, ethnic, or religious 
subgroups as they were in Canada, the U.S.S.R, and Yugoslavia. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 85. Id. at 595–96. 
 86. H.R. DOC. NO. 23-269 (1832), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/doc 
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 87. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2010, at 616. 
 88. See generally OLSON, supra note 45 (explaining that while secession may itself seem an 
excludable good, there remains the possibility of free-riding by states who hold back their support 
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2.  Free Trade 
In addition to winning wars and formulating a foreign policy, all 
countries have a strong national interest in trading with one another. 
International trade, by definition, leaves both sides better off, and it 
increases GDP in those countries that participate. Unfortunately, all 
governments need revenue to function, and taxes on international trade are 
often a politically popular way to raise money because powerful local 
economic interests may want to be shielded from foreign competition.93 
Aside from revenue-raising tariffs, governments may find themselves 
besieged by requests from politically powerful local interests to ban certain 
imports altogether.94 Without coordinated action, therefore, governments 
often find themselves with mutual bans on trade that hurt everybody 
concerned. Overcoming these bans on trade and acquiring access for one’s 
products to foreign markets typically requires that a government negotiate 
a free trade treaty with another country or countries. This is a costly and 
time-consuming endeavor. 
 The thirteen original American colonies did not have to worry about 
free trade or foreign markets in which to sell their products prior to 1776 
because they were part of the free trade system of the British Empire.95 
After independence and in the 1780s, however, America found itself 
without access to British or French markets, and the federal government 
under the Articles of Confederation had limited constitutional authority to 
make treaties permitting trade with foreign powers.96 The individual states, 
meanwhile, lacked the leverage to negotiate such treaties.97 Efforts were 
made twice to amend the Articles to give Congress the power to set duties 
on trade, but the first effort was vetoed by Rhode Island and the second by 
New York.98 A principle reason for writing the Constitution, therefore, was 
to give Congress the power to regulate trade and economic relations with 
foreign countries.99 
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 The universal need for trade thus turns out to be second only to the need 
for mutual defense as a reason for the creation of national or international 
governing entities. As the number of member states in a federation goes up 
from, say, thirteen to thirty-four or forty-eight, one would expect the need 
for delegation of power to negotiate trade agreements to federal or 
confederal governments to go up exponentially as well. If even the thirteen 
original American states needed a central government to negotiate trade 
treaties, then surely the fifty American states today need that central 
government even more badly.  
This point is augmented by the fact that federations need free trade 
domestically among their member states as well as with foreign countries. 
In 1789, the federal government thus acquired a power to regulate domestic 
interstate commerce, which Congress had lacked under the Articles of 
Confederation.100 As the number of member states in a federation goes 
from thirteen to thirty-four to forty-eight, the need for a central government 
with the power to protect domestic free trade goes up exponentially as 
well. Imagine the cost and time it would take for each of the fifty states 
today to negotiate a free trade agreement with all of the forty-nine states 
other than itself. Clearly, the need for free trade both with foreign nations 
and domestically is so powerful that many sovereign nations have entered 
into free trade pacts with their neighbors—or in the case of the European 
empires, with their colonies—whose pacts are enforced by some kind of 
confederal governmental structure. The European Union is one such 
structure, and the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) may well become another. Again, the greater the 
number of member states in a federation, the more the need for federal or 
confederal centralized governmental power.  
One would thus expect that as the number of members of a federation 
increases, the amount of regulation of interstate commerce and the scope of 
the federal government’s power over interstate commerce would increase 
as well. This, of course, is exactly what has happened in the United States. 
The nation started out in 1790 with only thirteen states, and from that time 
until the Civil War, Congress passed almost no laws exercising its 
commerce power, and this power was mainly enforced in the Supreme 
Court’s dormant Commerce Clause case law, about which we will say 
more below. Arguably, Congress’s first major exercise of its power to 
regulate interstate commerce came in 1887 with the passage of the 
Interstate Commerce Act and the creation of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.101 Three years later, in 1890, Congress passed a second major 
statute regulating interstate commerce, the Sherman Antitrust Act.102 In 
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1887, there were thirty-eight states in the Union, and by the end of 1890, 
there were forty-four.103 Obviously, the rationales for passing  these federal 
statutes are complex and various, but it must have been far easier for 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce in a Union of forty-four states 
than in a Union of thirteen states. 
The Supreme Court dramatically expanded its doctrinal understanding 
of the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause in the 1903 case 
of Champion v. Ames,104 which came down at a time when there were 
forty-five states.105 Champion is of critical importance because it upheld 
regulations of interstate commerce enacted for moral rather than free trade 
purposes.106 The statute upheld in Champion regulated the interstate 
shipment of lottery tickets.107 In the wake of Champion, Congress passed 
federal morals laws governing interstate commerce in prostitution and in 
harmful food and drugs.108 Champion opened the door to what has proved 
to be an explosive growth in the federal police power. 
By 1912, the Union had added another three states and was up to forty-
eight members.109 A year later, the ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment gave the federal government the power to tax incomes without 
apportionment among the states.110 The Sixteenth Amendment, coupled 
with a federal police power under Champion, overturned the balance of 
American federalism. Before 1913, the federal government was dependent 
on the tariff for revenue, but the Sixteenth Amendment changed that, 
opening vast sums of money for federal use. Since Congress has almost 
unlimited power to attach strings to federal funds under the Constitution,111 
increasing the federal government’s revenue enormously meant an 
enormous increase in its power over the states as well. By the 1920s, even 
conservative Republican Congresses and presidents were spending federal 
money to promote maternal and infant health.112 The leap from this to 
spending federal funds for social security or welfare was only one of 
degree and not of constitutional dimension. 
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The Supreme Court did make a famous and much discussed effort to 
cabin the Commerce Clause in Hammer v. Daggenhart.113 The line the 
Court tried to draw was one that would allow Congress to regulate the flow 
of harmful goods across state lines, but not harmless goods, like the cotton 
goods manufactured with child labor in Hammer.114 The obvious objection 
to this line of reasoning was that if the federal Commerce Clause did not 
create a free trade zone, then goods made with child labor would encounter 
customs barriers when they crossed state lines.115 Instead of those customs 
barriers, such commerce encountered the public policy of the United States 
as established by federal law.116 It is an unanswerable objection. Indeed, at 
about the same time it was deciding Hammer, the Supreme Court upheld 
federal power in the Shreveport Rate cases to regulate rates on wholly 
intrastate railroad rates where such regulation had a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.117 The Shreveport Rate cases led inexorably to the 
conclusion that the Supreme Court reached in 1937 in NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel that Congress can, under the Commerce Clause read 
together with the Necessary and Proper Clause, regulate all wholly 
intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.118 The 
Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel upheld the federal labor laws, which 
regulated the conditions of manufacturing.119 A few years later, United 
States v. Darby overruled Hammer v. Daggenhart, and state power bit the 
dust.120 
What should we make of the fact that even after the ratification of the 
Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, the Supreme Court resisted federal power 
in Hammer in 1918 and in a couple of cases striking down New Deal 
statutes? Not very much. Hammer itself was an Indian summer of the old 
order.121  
There was another constitutional amendment adopted in 1913, only a 
year after the Union expanded to forty-eight states, that dealt yet another 
crippling blow to the states. We refer, of course, to the ratification of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, which ended direct election of senators by state 
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legislatures.122 This transformed the Senate from being a kind of U.N. 
Security Council of ambassadors from the several states into being an arm 
of the national government as well. That transformation was made possible 
in part because the expansion from thirteen states in 1790 to thirty-four in 
1860 to forty-eight in 1912 had the necessary effect of increasing the 
number of Senators from twenty-six to sixty-eight to ninety-six.123 A 
twenty-six member Senate elected by the state legislatures was small 
enough to be a real check on federal power. A ninety-six member Senate 
elected by the voters of the states was not. Moreover, by 1912, only fifteen 
states had originally been independent countries—the original thirteen plus 
Texas124 and (arguably) California125—while thirty-three had been carved 
out of federal territory. The very fact that the Seventeenth Amendment 
could be rammed down the throat of a Senate partly elected by state 
legislatures was proof of how dire the situation of federalism had become. 
As a matter of practical politics, the federal government had become 
constitutionally omnipotent by 1913, as Missouri v. Holland126 would 
begin to show. 
So why did the Court decide Hammer v. Daggenhart in 1918 and its 
taxing power companion, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,127 in 1922 the 
way it did? The answer is simply that it took time for the nine Supreme 
Court Justices, who had been picked in part by a federalist pre-Seventeenth 
Amendment Senate, to be replaced by more nationalist Supreme Court 
Justices confirmed by a post-Seventeenth Amendment Senate. The first 
Justice appointed after these momentous events was Attorney General 
James McReynolds, whose conservative pro-state power views had been 
shaped by a lifetime growing up in a different Union from the one the 
United States had become.128 McReynolds became one of the four 
conservative Justices on the Court of the 1930s who were referred to as the 
“Four Horsemen” of the apocalypse.129  
The lag in Supreme Court turnover was augmented by the fact that 
conservative Presidents William Howard Taft and Warren G. Harding 
filled ten vacancies on the Supreme Court in holding the White House for 
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 127. 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (striking down a tax that sought to indirectly regulate child labor, a 
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seven years; however, progressive Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and 
Woodrow Wilson got only six vacancies despite holding the White House 
for more than twice as long—fifteen years.130 The Supreme Court that 
struck down a lot of New Deal laws between 1933 and 1937 on a five-to-
four vote had no appointees of Franklin Delano Roosevelt on it.131 Three of 
the five Justices who voted with the majority in Jones & Laughlin Steel—
the famous switch in time that helped to save nine—were appointees of 
Republican Herbert Hoover,132 while one was an appointee of Republican 
Calvin Coolidge.133 Only one of the five justices who made the switch in 
time that saved nine was appointed by a progressive president.134 In 
contrast, two of the four Jones & Laughlin Steel dissenters were Harding 
appointees while one was the Wilson appointee, McReynolds.135 The final 
dissenter was Willis Van Devanter, appointed by Republican President 
Taft. Our conclusion is that Hammer v. Daggenhart and the Indian summer 
of the constitutional order of dual federalism were the result only of a lag 
before the nationalizing effects of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Amendments could be felt.  
 Yale Law School Professor Bruce Ackerman has famously argued that 
American Constitutional history is usefully divided into three regimes: the 
Founders’ Republic, the Middle Republic, and the New Deal Republic, 
with constitutional moments and change occurring in 1789, 1868, and 
1937.136 There is a case to be made for Ackerman’s periodization based on 
Supreme Court doctrine. In fact, Ackerman is right that we have had three 
regimes with respect to the scope of federal power, but the key fact one 
needs to know is that the Union had thirteen states in 1790, thirty-four in 
1860, and forty-eight in 1913. The increase in the number of states first 
made Southern secession too expensive to organize as a matter of 
collective action, and it then made any residual claims of state power and 
dual federalism impossible to maintain during the Progressive era. There 
was indeed a Rooseveltian transformative presidency, but it was 
Republican Theodore Roosevelt rather than his Democratic cousin who 
created the political climate that led to the Sixteenth and the Seventeenth 
Amendments’ obliteration of dual federalism. Our three transformational 
presidents are Federalist George Washington and Republicans Abraham 
Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt. FDR just piled on for the ride. 
                                                                                                                     
 130. Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure 
Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 846 (2006). 
 131. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 128 (illustrating that the 
first Justice nominated by President Franklin Roosevelt—Hugo Black—did not take the oath of 
office until August 1937).  
 132. Id. (Justices Charles Hughes, Owen Roberts, and Benjamin Cardozo were appointed by 
Hoover). 
 133. Id. (Justice Harlan Stone was appointed by Coolidge). 
 134. Id. (Justice Louis Brandeis was appointed by Wilson). 
 135. Id. (Justices George Sutherland and Pierce Butler were appointed by Harding). 
 136. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 58 (1991). 
20
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss1/1
2011] THE NUMBER OF STATES AND THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 21 
 
B.  Externalities 
 Another commonly mentioned problem that favors national or 
transnational power is a need for a national or transnational entity that can 
stop state laws that generate serious negative externalities for other 
states.137 A classic example of such a negative externality might be, until 
recently, air pollution emissions by Midwestern manufacturing states that 
caused acid rain in New England. A state generating such negative 
externalities might have little political incentive to correct them because 
the state’s own citizens may benefit from manufacturing, the costs of 
which are felt mainly by out-of-staters with no vote in the manufacturing 
state’s elections. 
How would the expansion from thirteen states in 1790 to thirty-four 
states in 1860 to forty-eight states in 1912 affect the externality-correcting 
case for the enhancement of national power? Obviously, a greater number 
of states will generate a far greater number of externalities. As it happens, 
forty-eight is roughly four times thirteen, but the number of externalities 
will increase exponentially. It is thus entirely predictable that federal power 
would grow steadily as the number of states increased: first with the 
emergence in the Founders’ Republic of the dormant Commerce Clause138 
and of federal common law,139 and then with the emergence during the 
Middle Republic of the Sherman Antitrust Act,140 the Interstate Commerce 
Commission,141 federal paper money in peacetime,142 federal rules 
proscribing polygamy,143 and a federal police power for interstate 
gambling,144 prostitution,145 and shipment of impure food and drugs.146 The 
post-1913 Progressive Republic with its forty-eight states has seen federal 
government power mushroom exponentially to the point where the growth 
of six marijuana plants in one’s own home is a federal crime because of the 
harmful external effects that growing those plants is said to have on other 
                                                                                                                     
 137. See Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal 
Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 556 (1994). 
 138. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 240 (1824). 
 139. See generally Robert C. Palmer, The Federal Common Law of Crime, 4 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 267, 271 (1986) (examining “the evidence for an early federal common law of crime and 
reconstruct[ing] the constitutional basis of the early statutes and cases”). 
 140. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–7 (2006)). 
 141. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified in scattered sections of 
49 U.S.C.) (created the Interstate Commerce Commission). 
 142. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (1 Wall.) 457, 552 (1870). 
 143. Morill Anti-Bigamy Law of 1862, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501. 
 144. Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 191, 28 Stat. 963 (suppressing lottery traffic through national 
and interstate commerce). 
 145. White Slave Traffic Act of 1910, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2421–2424 (2006)). 
 146. Pure Food Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). 
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states.147 
The greater the number of states, the greater the number of externalities, 
and the larger the role of the federal or confederal government. In theory, 
confederations could negotiate solutions to externalities among their 
members just as they could all adopt codes of uniform state laws. In 
practice, the costs of negotiating such collective action become prohibitive 
once the number of federal subunits becomes too large.148 As a result, 
federations with a lot of federal subunits will have very powerful central 
governments. 
Canada with ten provinces,149 Germany with sixteen states (called 
Länder),150 Australia with six states,151 Switzerland with twenty-six 
cantons or half cantons,152 and the European Union with twenty-seven 
member nations,153 have all been able to maintain some meaningful limits 
on federal or confederal power. The United States was able to do the same 
as late as 1860, when the United States had as many as thirty-four states. 
But once one gets to that large a number of federal subunits, the increase in 
the number of externalities and the ability of the states to defend their 
authority from national expropriation begins (as Karl Marx might say) to 
wither away. We shall return below to the question of what is the optimal 
number of states for maintaining dual federalism, but we strongly suspect 
that the United States surpassed that magic optimal number a long time 
ago. The U.S. federation of fifty states has come dangerously close to 
omnipotent federal government. 
There is a school of thought that suggests that there are political 
safeguards for state power in the United States, because the states draw 
boundary lines for U.S. House districts, elect senators by state, and elect 
the President and Vice President through the federalist mechanism of the 
Electoral College.154 As a practical matter, however, the states are so 
dependent on federal appropriations and on the income tax subsidy for 
state and local taxation, that the federal government is essentially 
omnipotent as far as the political branches are concerned. There is no area 
                                                                                                                     
 147. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005). 
 148. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 47, at 15–19 (discussing the effects of 
prohibitive transaction costs of bargaining to solve externality problems). 
 149. The World Factbook 2010, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2051.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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 154. See generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (expanding on Professor Herbert Wechsler’s notion of 
political safeguards to include contemporary party politics); Herbert Wechsler, The Political 
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (arguing that elements of the political process 
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of law—not family law, not tort law, not education, not health care, not 
criminal law, not obscenity law, not religion clause law, and not abortion 
nor gay rights law—where the federal government has not had the last 
word, either through Congress or the Supreme Court. The federal 
government has in recent times established a fifty-five mile per hour speed 
limit155 and a national drinking age of twenty-one.156 There is little of 
importance that must be decided in the United States at the state level. 
One symptom of this brooding omnipresence of federal law is the 
gradual incorporation of the Bill of Rights and of natural and inalienable 
rights into § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to constrain state action. The 
first incorporation case involved the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and occurred in 1897,157 when the Union had already grown to 
include forty-five states.158 By 1905, the Supreme Court, in Lochner v. 
New York, imposed substantial additional national constitutional 
constraints on state power.159 Most of the Bill of Rights beyond the 
Takings Clause was incorporated in the period between 1925160 and 
1969,161 while the Union went from forty-eight to fifty states.162 
Unenumerated, national, natural law rights were judicially enforced in the 
economic arena from 1905 to 1937, and then with respect to personal, non-
economic matters from 1965 to the present.163 For the last 105 years, critics 
have complained that national rights creation by the Supreme Court 
infringes on state power, reduces competition and experimentation, and is a 
usurpation of power by the high Court.164 This criticism, loud and 
persistent though it has been, has proven to be ineffectual. Once the 
number of states hit forty-five in 1896, forty-eight in 1912, and fifty in 
                                                                                                                     
 155. Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-239, § 2(b), 87 Stat. 1046 
(1974) (repealed 1975). 
 156. National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1984). 
 157. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234–35 (1897). 
 158. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2010, at 454. 
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 164. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing 
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1959,165 the creation of a national human rights law was likely 
unstoppable. Likewise, incorporation and substantive due process were 
likely inevitable once the number of states hit forty-five. In retrospect, the 
federal ban on polygamy in Utah was a forerunner of what was to come.166 
There is one respect in which federal elimination of state-caused 
externalities diminished as the number of states increased. The states have 
gained with respect to less vigorous enforcement of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, the elimination of the Supreme Court’s role through 
federal common law in creating a uniform federal commercial law, and the 
establishment during the New Deal of a more state-friendly standard for 
federal preemption of arguably conflicting state laws. These developments 
do not, however, respect a newfound desire to empower the states so much 
as they reflect a federal policy of encouraging economic planning and rent-
seeking behavior. We will have more to say below about why increasing 
the number of federal subunits would have been likely to encourage state 
efforts to get Washington to enable and enforce cartels. 
C.  Economies of Scale 
Another economic argument for national or international power derives 
from the economies of scale that are gained if some activities are done 
once by a national or international government rather than fifty times by 
state governments. We think it is self-evident that there are economies of 
scale that are gained by letting the national government create an Air 
Force, a National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and a medical 
science research program through the National Institutes of Health, none of 
which is authorized as enumerated powers of the federal government. This 
is why Britain, France, and Germany chose not to create their own space 
programs but instead pooled their efforts into a trans-European space 
program. Less is not always more, and sometimes bigger is better. This is 
why national grocery market chains have largely replaced corner grocery 
stores. The advantage of national and international governmental entities is 
that they can realize economies of scale that the fifty states cannot. 
 So how does increasing the number of states from thirteen to thirty-four 
to forty-eight affect this economic normative argument in favor of 
enhanced federal power? Imagine here the difference between a United 
States with four states—the Northeast, the South, the Midwest, and the 
West—as compared with the current fifty state structure. A federation with 
fifty subunits rather than four will be more likely to experience economies 
of scale from enhanced national power. A federal subunit consisting of the 
Northeast or the West might well fund its own stem cell research program, 
for example, when the state of Massachusetts acting alone would not 
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undertake such an expense. California today has its own global warming 
and environmental policies,167 in part because it has about one-ninth of the 
total population of the United States,168 it is geographically the third largest 
of the fifty states,169 and it has an economy that would be one of the largest 
in gross domestic product (GDP) in the world if California were an 
independent sovereign nation.170 Carving the territory of the United States 
into fifty rather than four regions inevitably means more activities will 
exist for which there are economies of scale from undertaking action at the 
federal level, which inevitably means a more powerful federal government. 
In theory, of course, the states could negotiate to undertake joint 
activities and thus to realize economies of scale. To some extent, the states 
do that when (with federal permission) they create regional airport 
authorities and other such entities. The problem again is that the greater the 
number of federal subunits, the higher the cost of collective action. And, 
the higher the costs of collective action, the greater the incentive just to 
empower the federal government and let it handle the problems in 
question. 
This point, in conjunction with the other points about the escalating 
costs of collective action as the number of territorial subunits increases, 
suggests that the prospects for the success of the European Union may be 
bright indeed. The EU already has twenty-seven member nations, and there 
remains a line of nations wanting to join.171 An EU with twenty-seven 
member nations will often experience economies of scale by doing things 
itself rather than leaving them to be done by Germany, France, or the U.K. 
alone. Moreover, there will be many externalities eliminated by EU action 
and a diminished ability of any one of the twenty-seven member nation 
states to threaten credibly to secede or play holdout. The EU is fast 
approaching the thirty-four state threshold the United States experienced in 
1860 when the South discovered that the costs of collective secessionist 
action had become prohibitively high. If conservative elements of the Tory 
Party in the U.K. were to regain control of the Prime Minister’s office and 
of Parliament, could they ever withdraw from the EU or nullify an EU 
policy? We doubt it—although it might well be wise for the United States 
to offer the U.K. membership in NAFTA if such a state of events were to 
occur. 
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The bottom line is that increasing the number of member subunits in 
any federation or confederation obviously increases collective action costs, 
thus leading to enhanced national power. The key, therefore, to 
understanding the changes in America’s constitutional balance between 
federal and state power from the Founders’ Republic to the Middle 
Republic to the Modern Republic is to be found in the increase in the 
number of states from thirteen to thirty-four to forty-eight and now fifty. 
Our argument helps explain the dissolution of federations and nations in 
the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia and the tension experienced 
in federations like Canada with ten provinces and Belgium with two 
language groups. Federations of twenty-six cantons or half cantons like 
Switzerland or of twenty-seven nations like the EU seem to be quite stable 
as systems of dual federalism. Once the number of federal subunits hits the 
high 30s or 40s, dual federalism ends and is replaced by functional national 
omnipotence. 
D.  Pluralism and Civil Rights 
 A fourth argument for national and international power has its origins 
in a debate that went on between 1787 and 1788, during the ratification 
process for the U.S. Constitution. Opponents of the Constitution, who 
called themselves the Anti-Federalists, argued that democracy was only 
possible in small city-states like Athens and Rome, before it acquired its 
empire.172 They claimed that government had to keep close to the source of 
its power (the people) to reduce agency and monitoring costs.173 Direct 
popular participation in governments larger than a city-state was obviously 
not feasible in the 18th Century given then-available technologies. 
Moreover, the Framers’ prior experience with a sort of federalism through 
membership in the British Empire had soured them on the feasibility of 
making a distant imperial government responsive to democratic 
preferences in the provinces. 
James Madison responded to this argument with his now famous 
argument in The Federalist No. 10, the genius of which has only come to 
be appreciated in modern times. The discussion that follows draws from 
the author’s law student Note in the Yale Law Journal published twenty-
eight years ago.174 As explained there, Madison argued in The Federalist 
No. 10 that the gravest threat to democracy came from violent factional 
conflicts.175 In saying this, he was undoubtedly thinking of the religious 
wars in 17th Century England among Anglicans, Catholics, and Puritan 
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dissenters,176 as well as the fights among merchants, farmers, investors, 
and debtors, which were then plaguing America.177 Madison argued that 
federalism would help solve one of the key problems of democracy, which 
was the ever-present risk of a tyranny of the majority.178 Such a tyranny 
occurs, according to Madison, when an entrenched majority faction 
consistently decides an issue or a set of issues unjustly for its own self-
interested benefit.179 Madison thought that “‘[t]he latent causes of 
faction . . . [were] sown in the nature of man,’”180 but that they were 
aggravated in small democratic city-states where one monolithic faction or 
alliance of factions could entrench itself and abuse the minority.181 
Madison identified two structural features of the federal government that 
he believed would make majority tyranny less likely at the federal level 
than it had been in the thirteen states. 
 First, Madison argued that a federal republic of thirteen states would 
have a much greater variety of interest groups and factions than would any 
one state alone.182 This increase in the number and variety of factions, 
Madison argued, would make it harder for a permanent tyrannical majority 
coalition to form and to endure at the national level as compared to the 
state level.183 The many factions in national majority coalitions would have 
dissimilar interests that likely would conflict over time.184 As Madison 
predicted, designing the compromises necessary to hold such coalitions 
together has proven difficult for national leaders.185 FDR’s New Deal 
coalition ultimately broke apart over civil rights, when southern and 
northern Democrats went their separate ways, a process that was evident as 
early as the midterm elections of 1938.186 The Reagan Revolution 
ultimately foundered when social and economic conservatives parted 
company, a process that was evident when the popular President Ronald 
Reagan could not get social conservative Judge Robert Bork confirmed to 
the Supreme Court. 
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 Ultimately, the difficulty of maintaining a permanent majority coalition 
in Congress has proven to be similar to the difficulty that groups like 
OPEC face in maintaining a large, multi-member cartel.187 Like such 
cartels, majority coalitions in Congress usually have more members than 
their leaders can keep happy at the same time. Some of those members thus 
find themselves inevitably led by their own self-interest to seek new and 
more promising allies.188 Southern Democrats thus defected out of the New 
Deal coalition over civil rights issues, just as socially liberal suburban 
Republicans defected out of the Reagan coalition over social issues. The 
result is that national majority coalitions of factions or special interest 
groups are hard to form—and even harder to hold together over time. Such 
national coalitions are unlikely to harden into entrenched majority and 
minority blocks.189 Self-interest and the stunning variety of factions in the 
constantly changing political landscape of a large federal republic prevent 
any one group from monopolizing the political marketplace. 
At the state level, however, the smaller number of factions facilitates 
the formation of entrenched majority coalitions.190 Entrenched majority 
coalitions form most easily in homogenous legislatures with few factions, 
just as cartels form most easily in homogenous markets with few 
producers.191 The more competitive or fluid the environment, the more 
difficult cartelization becomes. Further, competitive environments with 
large numbers of dissimilar factions quickly wear away any entrenched 
majorities. 
 The fact that majority coalitions are less stable at the federal level than 
at the state level means that consistent tyranny by the same majority over 
the same minority is less likely at the federal level. Congressional leaders 
will often be in need of the votes of those sympathetic to minority rights in 
the future, so they will have more of an incentive to treat minorities fairly. 
The political processes at the federal level are thus less likely to be 
curtailed by the kind of prejudice that John Hart Ely wrote about in 
Democracy and Distrust.192 Indeed, by forcing national congressional 
leaders to bid for their support, minority groups in Congress may acquire 
the political leverage of single-issue voters, able to extract political 
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concessions in Congress that they could never have obtained at the state 
level. The larger number of factions at the federal level, and the instability 
this causes in congressional coalitions, thus, benefits minorities by making 
prejudice more costly and less likely at the federal level than at the state 
level. 
A second feature of the federal government that works to protect 
minority rights, as Madison explained, involves the large numbers of 
people who must be brought together in a large democracy in order to form 
a popular majority coalition.193 As Mancur Olson long ago pointed out194 
and as Madison anticipated, large numbers create a communication 
problem by making it hard for would-be oppressors “‘to discover their own 
strength and to act in unison.’”195 As Madison foresaw, communication 
and organizational costs are comparatively lower for discrete and insular 
minorities than for large amorphous groups.196 Richard Nixon’s famous 
silent majority was silent because it was too expensive to communicate. 
The very cohesiveness of minorities, as well as their discreteness and 
insularity, make it comparatively more expensive and less likely for 
majorities to organize than for special interest groups to organize.197 
As the size of a polity expands, this organizational advantage that 
minorities have over majorities becomes even more pronounced. Of 
course, modern communications technologies have greatly lowered the 
costs to majorities of organizing and communicating, but they have 
correspondingly lowered those costs for minorities and factions, as well. 
The development of first conservative talk radio and then of the Internet 
sites that supported the Barack Obama presidential campaign illustrate this 
vividly. 
In sum, Madison’s variety-of-interests argument and his organizational 
costs argument are interdependent. Low organizational costs for minority 
factions in Congress would prove useless if that body were dominated by a 
stable majority coalition.198 Such a situation may be typical of state 
legislatures, leaving minorities with little room to exploit their 
organizational advantage. At the same time, the instability of congressional 
coalitions would not help minorities much if they could not afford to 
organize more easily than the majority. It is for this reason that large 
amorphous groups like taxpayers, whose organizing costs are high, lose out 
                                                                                                                     
 193. Note, supra note 174, at 1408 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83 (James Madison) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 194. OLSON, supra note 45. 
 195. Note, supra note 174, at 1408 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83 (James Madison) 
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to special interest rent-seekers. 
The political influence and organizational strength of minorities at the 
federal level together lead to better protection for minorities in Congress 
than in the state legislatures. This has historically been true for the minority 
of property owners at the founding, for African-Americans, and for crony 
capitalist rent-seekers alike throughout American history. The very 
discreteness and insularity that render minorities vulnerable at the state 
level accords them power disproportionate to their numbers in the federal 
legislative process. Whereas state procedure and structure reinforce the 
tendency of majorities to tyrannize minorities, federal procedure and 
structure weaken any such tendency. As Madison remarked, “‘[I]n the 
extent and proper structure of the Union . . . we have beheld a republican 
remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.’”199 
How then did the expansion of the federal government from a league of 
thirteen states on the Atlantic seaboard in 1790 to a league of thirty-four 
states stretching to the Pacific Ocean to a league of forty-eight states 
encompassing much of North America affect the normative case for 
national power? Obviously, this expansion increased the number and 
heterogeneity of interest groups represented in Congress and in other 
federal institutions. A transcontinental democratic empire engaged in 
extensive global trade with many religious and ethnic subgroups has many 
more interest groups than the United States did in 1790, and further, those 
interest groups  differ more from one another. The formation of permanent 
majority cartels in Congress thus ought to be harder now than at the 
Founding, and special interests correspondingly ought to be more 
powerful. 
Of course, the states too have grown in population, and several new and 
very large states have been admitted to the Union, including California, 
Texas, and Florida. These mega-states, more populous by far than the 
whole United States in 1790, will, according to The Federalist No. 10, be 
less prone to majority tyranny than, say, Rhode Island. But compared to the 
vast federal government, even mega-states like California, Texas, and 
Florida will be easier for majorities to capture and to hold than will be 
Congress. It is striking in this regard that Republicans at this writing appear 
to have a lock on the governorships, state senates, and state houses of 
representatives in Texas and Florida, while Democrats have a lock on the 
state legislature in California and a newly elected Democrat governor. In 
all three states, as in others, Republican and Democratic voting patterns 
correlate strongly with race, ethnicity, and gender.200 Majority tyranny is 
more likely even in mega-states than it is at the federal level, and it is 
much more likely in states that are geographically small, like Rhode 
                                                                                                                     
 199. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 200. David E. Campbell, Voter Turnout and Vote Choice, in GUIDE TO POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 
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Island, or that have low populations, like Wyoming. 
So again, we ask: What if the current geographical territory of the U.S. 
was divided among only four regional mega-state or only ten provinces, as 
in Canada? We saw above that costs of secession and of resistance to 
federal power to the states would decrease, but what would the picture look 
like for, say, civil rights protection? In a U.S. federation of four mega-
states—the Northeast, the South, the Midwest, and the West—one would 
expect more tolerance at the state level than we see today or than wehave 
seen over the course of American history. Four large, heterogeneous states 
would be less likely dominated by entrenched majority tyrannies than were 
thirty-four in 1861 or forty-eight in 1912. Still, one cannot help wondering 
in such a four state U.S. federation how African-Americans would fare in 
the South or how devoutly religious Americans with traditional values 
would fare in the Northeast. In the West in recent years, California’s 
politics have been roiled by bitter warfare over cultural/religious and 
racial/ethnic issues.201 Our intuition is that the current transcontinental 
United States federation would do a better and fairer job of avoiding 
entrenched majority tyrannies than would even a four mega-states 
federation occupying the same territory. 
The United States, of course, did not go down the four mega-state road, 
having opted instead for a large number of smaller states starting with the 
Northwest Ordinance in 1787.202 What are the consequences for the 
normative case as to civil rights protection of the fact we went from 
thirteen states in 1790 to thirty-four in 1861 to forty-eight in 1912 to fifty 
today? Does the fact that the expansion in the number of states coincided 
with our adding new territory and immigrants mitigate any increased 
likelihood of majority tyranny at the state level? It seems likely that the 
addition of territory and of immigrants suggests that the states as a whole 
are not less diverse today than they were in 1787. Indeed, there are almost 
certainly more factions in present day Virginia or Rhode Island than there 
were in the 1790s. Moreover, some new states, like Arizona, are very 
heterogeneous, even if others, like Wyoming, are less so. 
Still, the press and politically active pundits must monitor all fifty state 
governments today for civil rights violations, instead of merely thirteen. 
This undoubtedly allows abuses to go unpunished. Moreover, Congress 
today represents a far greater variety of factions than it did 220 years ago. 
The Federalist No. 10 case for enhanced national power because such 
power reduces the danger of majority tyranny is thus stronger today than it 
was at the founding. And, it is stronger in a Union of thirty-four or forty-
eight or fifty states than it is in a Union of four mega-states occupying the 
same territory and including the same population. The greater the number 
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of states, the more federal civil rights law one might expect to see. Thus, it 
is no surprise that Congress passed the first civil rights law in 1866 when 
the Union had thirty-six states; that the Supreme Court began incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights in 1897, when we had forty-five states and essentially 
finished it once we were up to forty-eight and then fifty states; and that 
since we have had fifty states, Congress has legislated extensively to 
protect civil rights at the national level. Even the appearance of federal 
judicial invention of unenumerated civil rights against the states in 
Lochner203 in 1905 and in Griswold v. Connecticut204 in 1965 fits with this 
picture. 
The bottom line is that increasing the number of states from thirteen to 
fifty by itself makes federal civil rights law more desirable and likely, even 
without factoring in an addition of land and people. 
II.  THE NUMBER OF STATES AND THE CASE FOR AUGMENTING 
STATE POWER 
We want here to consider three economics of federalism arguments for 
augmenting state power in federations: first, that augmenting state power 
allows for a better tailoring of laws to varying tastes, conditions, and 
preferences; second, that augmenting state power leads to enhanced 
competition and experimentation; and third, that augmenting state power 
leads to lower monitoring costs. We address each point in turn by relating 
it to the change the United States has experienced as a result of moving 
from thirteen to fifty states.  
A.  Varying Tastes, Conditions, and Preferences 
A standard, pro-state power economic argument is that tastes, 
preferences, and conditions vary across the states in a federation. Montana 
has different needs with respect to a speed limit than does New Jersey. 
Louisiana and Utah have different preferences as to abortion than 
California or New York. By devolving some power from the national to the 
sub-national level, constitution writers can hope to maximize social 
welfare and utility. Many people will be happier if there is no national 
speed limit or abortion policy, and the diverging policies that result may be 
better tailored to real differences among the states and their peoples. A 
fifty-five mile per hour speed limit in Montana may not make sense 
because of the large size and low population density of that state. 
That tastes, conditions, and preferences vary geographically is a 
powerful argument for state power in the United States, for provincial 
power in Canada, and for real subsidiarity and member-nation power in the 
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 204. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding a right to privacy in the First, 
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European Union. The question becomes: How is that argument affected if a 
federation has a larger number of states—say, forty-eight—as opposed to a 
small number occupying the same geographical area and having the same 
population? A continental United States divided up among forty-eight 
states, as there were after 1912, rather than, say, four mega-states, would in 
theory be able to do a better job of tailoring laws to local tastes, 
preferences, and conditions, assuming the national government’s power 
and role stayed the same (which it would not). The larger the number of 
territorially defined states within the same geographical area and with the 
same population, the greater the ability to tailor state laws exquisitely and 
uniquely to each state’s different tastes, conditions, and preferences. This 
particular policy argument for federalism or devolution becomes stronger 
as the number of states increases, even as it becomes less likely that states 
will secede or have real political power at the national level. 
The self-selection or opt-out argument gains weight as the number of 
states increases within a given geographic area. When states are relatively 
numerous, the costs individual citizens bear by relocating between 
jurisdictions are lower than when states are few. In terms of dislocation, 
travel time (for economic or social reasons), and direct costs of relocation, 
moving a shorter distance is likely to result in lower costs than moving a 
greater distance. Increasing the number of states—or reducing legal or 
other barriers to relocation—is thus similar to reducing the poll tax on 
voting with one’s feet. By increasing mobility, having more states also 
ensures a higher correlation between the preferences of citizens of a state 
and the policies of that state. When citizens vote with their feet, they 
simply relocate their policy preferences to a more favorable political 
climate. This associative selection over time will lead to differences in 
substantive law even for states within close proximity, as citizens relocate 
to jurisdictions that more closely match their policy preferences. This 
should occur in any system but is particularly so in situations where the 
costs of opting out are lower. 
For instance, anyone living in Los Angeles who wishes to opt out of the 
particular governmental choices of California must bear a substantial cost 
in moving hundreds of miles (or to another nation). The costs of leaving 
Los Angeles are clearly higher than they would be for a similarly situated 
resident of Chicago, New York, or Washington—each of which is 
surrounded by three separate states and, therefore, three separate state-level 
polities. A resident of the District of Columbia upset by its strict firearms 
laws, high taxes, and lack of representation in Congress could simply move 
across the river to Virginia—with the only major disruption being a slight 
change (perhaps even an improvement) in his morning commute. The same 
cannot be said of a similar resident of Miami, FL. 
This argument for greater state power should be distinguished from the 
argument considered in Part II.B, viz., that competition among states leads 
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to beneficial innovation. The argument on preferences is based on the 
notion that there should be some level of divergence in the laws of 
different jurisdictions. The argument on competition is based on the notion 
that some laws or policies are simply better than others within a broad 
range of preference distributions. While it is possible that a society that 
rejected individual liberty and democracy as necessary conditions of good 
government might rationally choose laws quite different from those found 
in Western liberal democracies, it does not follow that Texas and 
Massachusetts are so distinct in their political preferences that they would 
not want the same type of efficiency in their laws. The gravamen of the 
local preferences argument is not that many states compete amongst 
themselves more effectively to supply bundles of government preferred by 
mobile citizens but rather that the demand for divergence in state 
government bundles is greater when there are more states because the costs 
of exercising the right to vote with one’s feet is lower. 
B.  Competition or Experimentation Among the States 
 A second and related economic argument for federalism and state 
power is that, in a federation, the member states will compete with each 
other for taxpayers, for industry, for the highest standard of living, and in 
providing the optimal governmental bundle of public goods.205 This 
competition among states will in turn spur experimentation. States will 
become laboratories of democracy, as Justice Louis Brandeis argued, 
competing with one another to offer their voters the optimal bundle of 
public goods.206 Thus, federalism not only allows for laws to be tailored to 
different tastes, conditions, and preferences, but it ideally also sets in place 
a free market of bundles of public goods.207 Citizens and businesses will 
vote with their feet for the optimal bundle, and states will experiment and 
compete vigorously with one another as a result.  
These are powerful arguments for state power, devolution, and 
subsidiarity, but how are they affected by increasing the number of states in 
a federation from thirteen to thirty-four to forty-eight? The answer, we 
submit, is evident from antitrust law, which tells us that a free market with 
forty-eight players generally will be more competitive and will lead to 
more experimentation and innovation than a market with thirty-four or 
thirteen players. As the number of players goes up, the market share of the 
largest players will be likely to go down, and the ability of the players to 
                                                                                                                     
 205. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 422 
(1956). 
 206. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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coordinate their activities voluntarily to form a cartel on their own will go 
down, too. Even when the states form a voluntary cartel, that cartel is less 
likely to prove to be stable in a forty-eight member federation than in a 
thirteen state member federation, because it is more likely that a state will 
defect and cheat on the cartel. When one of forty-eight states refuses to go 
along with a coordinated policy—reducing air pollution, for example—it 
will have less of a unilateral effect on the national average than if one of 
thirteen states does so. Thus, each individual state has less of an effect on 
the likelihood of achieving the common policy goal, so the temptation to 
avoid the cost and free ride on the other states increases with the number of 
states.  
This derives directly from the insight of Mancur Olson that small 
interest groups are more cohesive than large ones.208 The classic examples 
of each type are the trade group of a concentrated industry on the one hand 
and taxpayer or consumer groups on the other. The former group is 
substantially hindered in its goals if any member defects, whereas 
defection in the latter group is scarcely noticeable.209 In terms of 
competition between state governments, this implies that regional accords 
on issues such as pollution standards are less likely to occur as the number 
of states increases. 
Another reason to expect greater competition between many states has 
nothing to do with coordination. If the states can be conceived of as 
competing in the provision of public goods on a quantity rather than price 
basis, then the standard Cournot model of oligopolistic competition would 
predict that simply increasing the number of competitors would lead to a 
more efficient outcome.210 When there are few states, each essentially has 
greater market power, so it can unilaterally benefit from restricting its 
output of public goods to increase the value it derives from them. In the 
extreme case of a duopoly, both states would essentially produce lower 
quantities of ‘good law’ and reap political profits of special interest 
regulations. This is easily seen by analogy to standard economic markets, 
where two firms controlling the entire market would each produce fewer 
widgets—regardless of what the other did—than they would in a 
competitive market. Within a certain range, the increase in price from 
restricting output more than offsets the foregone sales. Each firm in the 
duopoly, expecting the other to act likewise, will restrict output to a level 
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that maximizes its own profit. This level is even lower because the other 
firm can be expected to also restrict its output from the competitive level. 
However, the ability of oligopolists to obtain supracompetitive profits 
plummets as the number of competitors increases. Of course, this 
discussion of the degree of competition is merely a step toward greater and 
more efficient experimentation in policy among the states. For these 
reasons, one would expect more bracing and vigorous competition among 
the states, leading to more experimentation as the number of states in the 
Union goes up. 
All of this experimentation and competition would be of little 
consequence if it did not systematically lead to better government. So, is 
there a reason to believe it does? Yes, and that reason is rent-seeking. 
Interest groups (Madison’s “factions”) naturally seek their own advantage. 
Pharmaceutical companies seek reduced tort liability; heavy industry seeks 
looser pollution controls; utilities seek regulated monopolies over 
unregulated competition. Some interest groups will be sufficiently 
motivated and organized to secure legislation granting them special 
protection from competition—including lawyers. These groups are not, 
however, the only ones benefiting from such arrangements. Politicians who 
grant such concessions do not do so out of charity to the most deserving 
industrial sectors. In fact, some research has been done on the in terrorem 
value of threatened legislation in extracting support from interest groups.211 
Absent some competitive force, the laws of each state would quickly 
devolve into a jumble of special interest concessions. 
Three such competitive forces are easily identified. The first and most 
obvious competitive force is the ballot box. Voters can and do rein in their 
representatives when they give away too much too noticeably.212 However, 
this requires a prohibitively high investment in monitoring and is subject to 
all the agency costs inherent in delegation of authority.213 Notably, the next 
politician may be even worse than the one just voted out.  
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The second competitive force is the long-term availability of rents to be 
distributed. Since rent-seeking interest groups must compete with 
themselves for the produce of valuable activities of the constituents of the 
state, earlier rents diverted to interest groups limit the output of the 
economic activities of the state in the future.214 That in turn limits the 
ability of future rent-seekers to obtain concessions. This obviously presents 
only a minor constraint and hardly holds any hope of efficient government.  
The third competitive force is the competition among states for mobile 
resources, whether capital or labor. Under the classic Tiebout model, states 
will be forced to compete for valuable resources by offering efficient 
bundles of government.215 States that experiment with efficient 
government will see their fortunes wax while those that adopt inefficient 
laws and regulations will see their fortunes wane.216 While it has been a 
subject of some debate, the primacy of Delaware in corporation law has 
long presented a conspicuous example of the potential power of state 
competition.217 
Unfortunately, all this competitive pressure is also likely to lead to 
more calls for federal help in forming and policing cartels, since 
government is the surest source of monopoly. One would therefore expect 
an increase in calls for federal government “standard setting” as the 
competition among the states intensifies. This, of course, is exactly what 
happened over the course of American history. When the number of states 
hit the mid-thirties, we got the federal floor as to standards set by the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. When the number of 
states hit forty-five, we began to see incorporation and Lochnerian 
substantive due process. By the time we got to forty-eight states in 1912, 
the constitutional dam broke and we saw the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Amendments, which enormously empowered the federal government. The 
Supreme Court held out for the old constitutional order for twenty-five 
years after 1912 thanks largely to Taft and Harding appointing ten Justices 
in seven years while Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson appointed 
only six in almost sixteen years, but by 1937, the game was up.218 After 
1912, the competition among states came to be viewed by our legal and 
academic elites as a race to the bottom that could only be stopped by a 
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federal cartel.219 From the New Deal on, this perception has carried the 
day, and so it can be correctly said that the competition among the states 
was so successful that it may have led to its own downfall. 
C.  Lower Monitoring or Agency Costs 
Another good economics of federalism policy argument for devolving 
power to the states is that agency costs in a federal system are inversely 
related to the number of states. Voters will experience lower costs 
monitoring their politicians in smaller democracies, and they will be better 
able to rein in their elected agents.220 In theory, assuming federal and state 
politicians receive comparable press coverage—which they do not—voters 
ought to be able to monitor more closely their elected state officials 
because they are closer to home, easier to meet with and see, more likely to 
be a neighbor, and are generally more accessible. In addition to the direct 
reduction in monitoring costs, the increase in monitoring level should lead 
to greater democratic control of politicians, thereby further reducing 
agency costs. As a consequence, state-elected officials should, in theory, be 
on a shorter leash than federal officials, assuming equal media coverage, 
comparable ethics, and similar criminal penalties for misconduct. 
Agency costs are of two main types: monitoring costs and enforcement 
costs. Agents, whether they are political representatives or hired 
employees, of course, have their own interests, some of which may conflict 
with those of their principals. In order to restrain agents, their bosses must 
first learn what the agents are doing. This monitoring cost, of course, rises 
when the agent is further removed from the principal. The principals must 
also learn their own interests if not readily apparent, which also becomes 
more of a problem when the scope of the agency expands.221 Next, the 
principals must incur costs to force the agent to do their bidding.222 In 
political terms, the voters must support a challenger—or at least credibly 
threaten to do so. Sometimes, this may be as costless as refusing to donate 
to a campaign fund, but it may just as well require funding a challenger. Of 
course, the more the principals monitor the agent’s actions, the closer the 
agent will adhere to their wishes. Similarly, the more easily the principals 
may control the agent, the more the agent will be constrained to do—or at 
least appear to do—what the principals intend. 
How does increasing the number of states affect agency costs? It ought 
quite obviously to lower both monitoring and enforcement costs. If we 
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disallow for differences in media coverage and in legal sanctions for 
misconduct, it should be easier to monitor state officials in more and 
smaller states than in a few bigger states. It is presumably easier to monitor 
the governor of Rhode Island or Alaska than it would be to monitor a 
governor of all the southern states, for example. Not only will the voters be 
more informed of their own interests in the smaller state but they will be 
better able to learn of the activities of the officials. One need only consider 
whether the newspapers of Washington, D.C., shine a brighter light upon 
the political acts of the federal government than newspapers in New York 
or Chicago. Even in an age of Internet communication, proximity reduces 
the cost of information. 
Similarly, the costs of enforcement will decrease as the number of 
states increases. It is easier to organize opposition in local elections than in 
statewide elections because there are fewer voters, who are located in a 
geographically confined area. This is in part because the number of voters 
needed to vote a state-level incumbent out of office rises. This will require 
a more organized and expensive campaign. The interests of the voters in a 
geographically dispersed area will also tend to be more diverse. Consider 
whether the interests of the voters in Ohio are similar to the interests of 
voters in Massachusetts. Organizing them to vote not merely against an 
incumbent but also for a particular challenger would be more difficult than 
it would be in either of these states alone. The more numerous the states, 
then, the greater the advantage of vesting power in them relative to the 
federal government. Thus, again, the argument for state power federalism, 
or for devolution, or for subsidiarity in the EU becomes stronger as the 
number of subparts in a federation increases. Federations with many 
subparts will experience lower monitoring and enforcement costs than 
federations with fewer subparts,  and since monitoring and agency costs 
were among the reasons why the United States declared its independence 
from the British Empire in 1776, this conclusion ought certainly to be of 
interest. 
III.  WHAT IS THE OPTIMAL NUMBER OF STATES? 
A.  The Number of States and Interest Group Pressure 
Although not as frequently mentioned as the salutary effect of 
federalism in curbing the influence of faction, the analysis in The 
Federalist No. 10 suggests a malign aspect as well. When the size of the 
federal system grows, it presents greater opportunity for widely dispersed 
but well organized groups to apply pressure at the federal level that they 
would be unable to apply in the states. Indeed, the externalities and 
competition discussed above encourage a shift of rent-seeking from the 
local to the national stage. Were any faction to prevail in one state, it 
would face competition from other states with more robust markets. The 
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rent-seeking effort of the faction in the first state would create positive 
externalities for competitors in other states, presenting the classic free-
riding problem that is the bane of all interest groups.223 To solve this 
problem, interest groups can organize at the federal level, but this tends to 
expand the scope of the national power over the states. As the number and 
interconnectedness of the several states increased, so too did factional 
demands for expanded federal regulation. 
Beginning with the fundamental insight of the Tiebout model, 
federalism is rightly seen as promoting efficiency in government through 
competition.224 When states must compete for labor and capital (and tax 
revenue), they are acting as producers of bundles of government in a 
competitive market. If they provide a bundle that consumers (in this case 
citizens and capitalists) demand, then they will prosper. If they offer 
corruption and waste, they will not. In essence, consumers of government 
will vote with their feet as well as their ballots.225  
Of course, this rosy image of efficiency and prudent government 
depends on effective competition and the mobility of both investment 
capital and some relevant segment of the population. William Rikerfurther 
refined this analysis by developing the conditions for a self-enforcing 
federalism, which requires that the hierarchical levels of government be 
autonomous and of limited scope.226 However, even this addition will only 
perpetuate some form of federalism, rather than the particularly desirable 
competitive market form of federalism that the Tiebout model envisions.  
To ensure a market-preserving federalism, Barry Weingast added three 
additional conditions: a national market, a hard budgetary constraint at the 
state level, and a division of powers that places primary responsibility for 
economic policies at the state level.227 The first two conditions are 
constitutionally provided228 and uncontroversial; the third is the linchpin of 
the analysis. It is here that the number of states becomes an issue of 
concern. 
In a federation of thirteen states with relatively limited interstate 
commerce, the natural locus for the provision of economic regulation is the 
state. When the number of states, the size of the federation, and the amount 
of commerce increase, regional regulation through informal agreements 
becomes more efficient. Increase the size yet further, and national 
regulation becomes more attractive. This is a result of several forces. First, 
transaction costs increase at an exponential rate as the number of relevant 
                                                                                                                     
 223. See Stigler, supra note 197, at 13 (noting that small minorities with strong preferences 
find the costs of procuring favorable regulation lowest). 
 224. Tiebout, supra note 205. 
 225. Id. at 418. 
 226. WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 11 (1964). 
 227. Weingast, supra note 52, at 4. 
 228. U.S. CONST. art. I §§ 8, 9 (prohibiting States from coining money or imposing duties). 
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bargaining parties grows. Second, economies of scale are realized through 
standardization, which produces greater benefits as the number of potential 
standards increases.229 Third, externalities from economic activity in one 
state are likely to be increasingly felt in other states as the number of states 
increases.230 Fourth, and finally, the increasingly competitive government 
market between states forces factions to seek economic rents through 
federal regulation.231 
This last force for centralization of economic regulation deserves 
particular consideration. The other forces are discussed above and all lead 
to the conclusion that an increase in federal power as the number of states 
increases merely maintains an optimal division of powers between the 
levels of government in our federal system. They offer the benign 
explanation for consolidation and expansion of government power. The 
influence of interest groups offers the malign explanation. It is this, above 
all, that suggests that having too many states leads to an excessive 
centralization of government and disrupts the vertical balance of powers in 
a federal system.232 The economics of federalism analysis explains why the 
balancing point has shifted in favor of national power; the interest group 
analysis suggests there is a thumb on the scales. 
As Madison recognized in The Federalist No. 10, an “extended 
republic” will indeed “break and control the violence of faction” on the 
state level by introducing countervailing interests.233 However, the 
transaction costs of organizing majority opposition to cohesive minority 
rent-seeking will grow as the number of states and the size of the nation 
increase.234 This results from the principal problem of organizing interest 
groups: free-riding.235 With respect simply to the number of states, an 
                                                                                                                     
 229. It is interesting to note the development of the major interstate commerce-facilitating 
actions by the federal government. First, the Bank of the United States solved a fundamental 
problem of financing transactions across great distances. Second, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission solved a problem of transportation efficiency after the advent of the railroads. Third, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission solved a problem of information disclosure with respect 
to investments in an increasingly national market. Fourth, the Federal Communications Commission 
removed telecommunications from the ICC jurisdiction when such interstate communications 
became increasingly widespread and complex. 
 230. This is the down side of experimentation. As the number of states grows, the potential for 
externalities increases if for no other reason than the proliferation of (potentially externality-
generating) policies. Holding the probability of externality generation constant, more policies in 
force should lead to more externalities, on average. 
 231. Aranson, supra note 1 (manuscript at 7–10). 
 232. This offers one explanation for the tendency of central governments to concentrate fiscal 
power over time, sometimes referred to as “Popitz’s Law.” For an overview of the literature on 
fiscal federalism, see generally MUELLER, supra note 45, at 227–29; Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on 
Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1120 (1999). 
 233. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 52 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 234. Aranson, supra note 1 (manuscript at 9). 
 235. See Stigler, supra note 197, at 13. 
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increase in states leads to an increase in competition under the Tiebout 
model. This then has the perverse effect of altering the calculus of interest 
groups in favor of federal rent-seeking, rather than state rent-seeking.236 
Precisely because of competition between the states, interest groups find 
greater benefit in pursuing national regulation.237 This then encourages an 
expansion of the central government at the expense of the state 
governments in the area of economic regulation, which undermines one of 
the conditions for self-enforcing, market-preserving federalism.238 It also 
systematically skews the balance of power away from the states and toward 
the federal government. 
By expanding from thirteen to thirty-four to fifty states, the United 
States has seen the balance of power shift in favor of centralization. The 
previous Parts have explained in detail how this has resulted quite naturally 
and benignly from the necessity of changed circumstances. Assuming 
diminishing marginal returns, both to the advantages of state-level 
government (competition and experimentation, agency costs, and 
adherence to local preferences) and to the advantages of federal level 
government (economies of scale, elimination of collective action problems, 
internalization of externalities, and the protection of minority interests 
through countervailing factions) as the number of states increases, there 
should be an equilibrium between state and federal power that maximizes 
the net value of all government. There should also be a number of states 
that is optimal—large enough for cohesion but small enough for true 
competition between the states. As the number of states increases, the 
advantage Madison ascribed to the “extended republic” of checking 
majority factions will begin to tip toward facilitating rent-seeking by 
minority factions. Just as the benign aspects of the economics of federalism 
suggest the benefit of more states in limiting rent-seeking by interest 
groups, the malign aspects suggest the benefit of fewer.  
B.  Implications—When Is Enough Too Many? 
 Our analysis thus far suggests that all the economics of federalism 
policy arguments both for national and for state power in the United States 
become more telling as the number of states increases. The fifty United 
States today need a national government more than would a four state 
federation in the same geographical territory because of collective action 
problems with respect to: (1) war and foreign affairs; (2) free trade; (3) 
correcting externalities imposed by state action; and (4) reaping the 
benefits of economies of scale. The fifty United States also need a national 
                                                                                                                     
 236. Aranson, supra note 1 (manuscript at 8–9). 
 237. Id.; see also MUELLER, supra note 45, at 227–29 (noting that, “[E]lected members of the 
Länder were willing accomplices in the process which stripped their governments of their tax 
authority . . . . to free themselves of the necessity of having to compete with one another in setting 
tax rates.”). 
 238. See Weingast, supra note 52, at 26–27. 
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government more today than would a four-state federation to protect civil 
rights and guard against tyranny of the majority. 
 On the other hand, a fifty state federation is more likely to allow for 
tailoring laws to suit differences in local tastes, conditions, and preferences 
than would be a four state federation. A fifty state federation will also do 
more to promote vigorous competition and experimentation among its 
members, which will have the negative side effect of increasing demands 
for federal floor-setting or cartelization. Finally, a fifty state federation may 
benefit from lower monitoring and agency costs.  
All of these arguments suggest that when a federation expands from 
thirteen to thirty-four to forty-eight states, it gets more of both the good and 
the bad things that come with having a federal as compared to a unitary 
constitutional structure. Ironically, fifty state competitive federalism may 
be potentially much better than twenty-five state competitive federalism, 
but it is also probably impossible politically to sustain because of the way 
in which state power is weakened when the number of states expands. The 
competition among fifty states and the collective action problems and 
externalities of a fifty state federalism produce unstoppable demands for 
national floor setting by cartels. If this argument is correct, it bodes ill for 
the fate of American federalism today and in the future. Once the number 
of U.S. states went from thirty-eight to forty-four in 1889–1890, the 
retention of any kind of meaningful American federalism through political 
checks was probably doomed. 
The immediate temptation, of course, is to conclude that to reap the 
benefits theoretically available from federalism, one ought to opt for a 
much smaller number of federal subunits like Canada’s ten provinces or 
the thirteen original states. This argument fails, however, because it 
overlooks the enormous danger of secession and civil war that comes along 
with a few-state federalism, as well as the likely weakening of national 
power that such a federalism would cause. Some federations like the six 
state Australian federation of course work just fine, but the dissolution of 
the fifteen republic U.S.S.R., or of the six republic Yugoslav federation, or 
of the two region regimes in Czechoslovakia and possibly Belgium, all 
raise major concerns. An interesting question in this regard is: When did it 
become politically too hard for the slave owning American South to secede 
from the Union? History tells us that it could not be done once the Union 
had hit thirty-four states in 1861, but it might still have been possible at the 
time of the Nullification Crisis when the United States had only twenty-
four states—half of them slave states—had not an implacable Andrew 
Jackson stood in the way. Any number of federal subunits below twenty 
and possibly below fifteen might thus be so low as to raise fears of 
secession depending critically, of course, on the territorial distribution of 
racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, and economic cleavages. 
 The mid-twenties looks in many ways like an optimal number of 
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subunits for maintaining a balance of power, a federal structure, and 
reaping the benefits of the economics of federalism. Switzerland with its 
twenty-six cantons or half cantons and the European Union with its twenty-
seven member nations may thus be at the optimum point around now, if 
one wants to create what the Supreme Court famously called “an 
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible states.”239 Consequently, 
further expansion of the EU might be a mistake that leading member 
nations ought to guard against, unless they actively want to see the 
European nation states disappear altogether. An EU federation might 
survive with larger numbers of subunits than did American federalism 
because of the long histories, separate languages, and distinctive 
subcultures of the EU member states as compared to the fifty American 
states. At some point that is not that far off, however, the number of 
subunits may make all efforts to maintain subsidiarity impossible. 
Moving beyond the federalism of the European Union, we should note 
the tremendous spotlight of public attention that President Obama just 
recently shined on the G-20,240a group of twenty nations from all over the 
world that are interconnected economically and are global leaders. For the 
first time, the G-20 received the kind of media attention normally reserved 
for meetings of the G-8. The G-8 consists of: Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States while the 
G-20 includes eleven nations in addition to these eight and the European 
Union: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey. Elevating the 
visibility and role of the G-20 and delegitimizing the G-8 is a shrewd way 
for the United States to play off giants like India, China, Brazil, and 
Argentina against rogue states and regimes hostile to Western liberal 
democracy. This Article suggests reasons to be more bullish about the 
prospects for success in the G-20 than in the G-8. 
Our bottom line is that the wealth of nations is enhanced by federalisms 
with a healthy balance between national and state power, and that, in turn, 
depends on the size of nations and, in this case, federations. The optimal 
number of subunits for a balanced federalism is probably somewhere 
between about eighteen and thirty-four, although there will be occasional 
exceptions like six state Australia. Even Canada with only ten Provinces 
has not broken apart—at least not yet. Federalists of the World Unite! But 
only in confederacies of between eighteen and thirty-four. 
                                                                                                                     
 239. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (7 Wall. 1868). 
 240. See generally, e.g., President Barack Obama, News Conference Following Second G-20 
Plenary Session (Sept. 25, 2009); President Barack Obama Remarks at G-20 Press Conference 
(June 27, 2010). 
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(13) 1776 - States Organize to Secede (13) 1791 - States Force Bill of Rights
(13) 1795 - States Force 11th 
Amendment
(16) 1798 - Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions
(17) 1810 - Fletcher v. Peck
(21) 1819 - McCulloch v. Maryland
(22) 1820 - Missouri Compromise
(24) 1833 - Nullification Crisis
(26) 1842 - Swift v. Tyson
(31) 1851 - Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens
(34) 1861 - Civil War (unsuccessful 
secession)
(37) 1868 - 14th Amendment Ratified
(38) 1887 - ICC Created
(44) 1890 - Sherman Act
(45) 1897 - Incorporation of Takings 
Clause
(45) 1903 - Champion v. Ames
(45) 1905 - Lochner v. New York
(48) 1913 - 16th & 17th Amendments 
Ratified; Fed. Reserve Bd. Created
(48) 1925 - Incorporation of Free 
Speech
(48) 1933 - New Deal
(48) 1947 - Adamson v. California
(50) 1964 - Civil Rights Act and the 
Great Society
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